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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, art. VI § 1, cl. 2 1 
"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made 
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or whicpi shall be made, under 
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; 
and the Judges in every State shall be bound therebk any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding..." 
n 
FURTHER ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the mandates imposed upon a biological father in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78B-6-121(3) are, in certain circumstances, dijie to jurisdictional issues, 
preempted by the federal Parental Prevention and Kidnaping Act. 
Standard of Review: Whether federal law preempts state law is a question 
of law which is reviewed de novo. In re Adoption ofA.B., 2010 UT 55 (2010). 
In addition, the interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we 
review for correctness, giving no particular deference to the lower court's 
conclusions. In re H.J., 1999 UT App 238, % 1J5, 986 P.2d 115. 
Preservation of the Issue: The conflict betweeh the PKPA and Utah Code 
Ann. 78B-6-121(3) creates a jurisdictional is^ue. This issue was not 
presented to the trial court, but the question of jurisdiction can be raised at 
any time. Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1^30, 1232 (Utah t. App. 1987). 
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SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT 
L THE MANDATES IMPOSED UPON BIOLOGICAL FATHERS IN 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-121(3) ARE IN CERTAIN 
CIRCUMSTANCES, PREEMPTED BY THE FEDERAL PARENTAL 
PREVENTION AND KIDNAPING ACT. 
The federal Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act "PKPA" precludes a state from 
exercising jurisdiction over a proceeding for custody or visitation determinations during 
the time another state has a pending proceeding to make a custody or visitation 
determination. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 1738(A)(g) states: 
"A court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction in any 
proceeding for a custody or visitation determiitation 
commenced during the pendency of a proceeding in a court of 
another State where such court of that other State is 
exercising jurisdiction consistently with the provisions of this 
section to make a custody or visitation determination." id. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-121(3) requires a biological father to initiate a 
proceeding in a District Court of the State of Utah to establish paternity in order to 
preserve the right of the father to consent to the adoption oif his child. Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-6-121(3). 
The PKPA and Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-121(3) are) conflicting in situations, like 
the present case, wherein the biological father has commenced an action in another state 
prior to the birth of his child to determine issues relating to the minor child including 
custody, yet, according to Utah law, the biological father rfiust submit to the jurisdiction 
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of Utah and commence a Utah proceeding despite his ongoing efforts in another state. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that a federal statute implicitly overrides state 
law either when the scope of a statute indicates that Congres$ intended federal law to 
occupy a field exclusively, or when state law is in actual conflict with federal law. 
Gordon Case & Co. v. West, 125 P.3d 894 (Utah 2005). The[se scenarios of implied 
preemption have acquired their own labels and have become Iknown as "field preemption" 
and "conflict preemption," respectively, id. 
This case involves conflict preemption. Conflict preemption occurs "where it is 
impossible . . . to comply with both state and federal requirements, or where state law 
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution df the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress." English v. General Electric Compdny, 496 U.S. 72 (1990). 
The PKPA precludes a state from exercising jurisdiction over a proceeding for 
custody or visitation determinations during the time another! state has a pending 
proceeding to make a custody or visitation determination. Hjowever, Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-6-121(3) requires a biological father to initiate a Utah {proceeding to preserve his 
rights to the child regardless of the fact he may have already commenced an action in 
another state pertaining to the minor child. 
Here, on May 19, 2009, the biological father, Marco|Donjuan filed a proceeding in 
his home state of Georgia where the child was conceived aijid where the birth mother also 
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resided. (R. 9). The Georgia proceeding included a specific request for custody of the 
minor child and a standing Domestic Relations Order issued by the Georgia Court which 
states, 
"DO NOT REMOVE CHILDREN - each party is hereby enjoined and 
restrained from unilaterally causing or permitting the lfninor child(ren) to be 
removed from the jurisdiction of this Court without permission of the Court, 
except in an emergency affecting the health, safety, oit welfare of the 
child(ren) which has been created b the other party to [this action." (R. 104-
107; R. 124-127). 
Applying the PKPA to the instant case, no other state I could obtain jurisdiction to 
make determinations regarding custody or visitation of the n^inor child at issue during the 
pendency of the Georgia action. The Georgia paternity action, including the birth father's 
request for custody is still pending in Georgia as only the legitimation portion of the 
Georgia filing was dismissed. (R. 148-149). 
The Utah state law found in Utah Code Ann. 78B-6-|21(3) is in conflict with 
federal law, specifically the PKPA as it requires a biological father to commence an 
action in Utah even though another state is exercising jurisdiction over a matter involving 
the minor child at issue. This Court has previously recognized on more than one 
occasion that "as a federal jurisdictional state, the PKPA establishes a policy of federal 
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preemption in the area of custody jurisdiction". Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 721 n. 8 
(Utah Ct. App, 1990). Therefore, the requirements of Utah Code Ann § 78B-6-121(3) 
are preempted by the PKPA and therefore, the trial Court wa^ in error to assume 
jurisdiction over the matter and make determinations regarding the rights of the biological 
father, Marco Donjuan. 
A. THE MAY 19,2009 GEORGIA PETITION FILED BY THE 
NATURAL FATHER QUALIFIES AS "ANY PROCEEDING FOR A 
CUSTODY OR VISITATION DETERMINATION" FOR 
PURPOSES OF THE PKPA. 
In the state of Georgia, a paternity proceeding may be commenced prior to the 
birth of a child and the Georgia Court issued a specific finding evidencing this fact in 
their Order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (R. 148-149). 
The May 19, 2009 verified Petition To Legitimate and for ICustody & Support does 
address the issue of custody as clearly indicated in the title of the pleading. Count Two (2) of the 
Petition, Paragraph Seven (6) requests that the biological father b0 granted primary physical and 
legal custody of the minor child. (R. 104-107) 
Also, the prospective adoptive parents knew about the biological father's request for 
custody as the search with the Utah State Register of Vital Statistics confirmed there had been a 
paternity filing in Utah prior to the consent of the birth mother an|d counsel for the prospective 
adoptive parents obtained a copy of the Petition filed by the biological father, Marco Donjuan. 
Here, the verified Petition for Legitimation, Custody and Child Support filed in the state 
of Georgia on May 19,2009 qualifies as "any proceeding for a custody or visitation 
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determination" for purposes of the PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(g) including, but not limited to the 
foregoing reasons: 
1. The Georgia Court was exercising jurisdiction over the paternity matter as of May 
19, 2009, over two months prior to the consent of the birth mother being taken; 
2. The Georgia Court continues to exercise jurisdiction; 
3. The Georgia matter addressed the issues of custody and requested the Georgia 
Court to make determinations regarding custody; 
4. Birth Mother was served with the Domestic Relations Action Standing Order 
which enjoined and restrained the parties, mother ahd father, from removing the 
child from the state of Georgia without the consent of the Court absent an 
emergency. 
Therefore, the Georgia action qualifies as a proceeding for a custody or visitation 
determination for purposes of the PKPA. 
CONCLUSION 
The PKPA operates to divest the Courts of Utah of jurisdiction to hear this case. The state 
of Georgia is the proper forum for any custody determinations. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 10th day 
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